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NUCLEAR POWER:
LEGAL SOLUTIONS
FOR LETHAL PROBLEMS
Edward B. Myers*
INTRODUCTION
This essay considers environmental hazards of the nuclear energy electrical
generating industry and the legal remedies for those hazards. Primary emphasis is
given to federal legislation. Technical and other non-legal remedies lie beyond the
scope of the topic. Problems unrelated to reactor generation of electricity and
legislation designed to assist industry development rather than solve environ-
mental problems are not discussed. Finally, human safety considerations are
touched upon only tangentially in order to lay greater emphasis on the ecological
impact of the nuclear industry. The author, of course, recognizes that human
safety is a distinctive facet of environmental safety which requires separate treat-
ment at another time.
BACKGROUND
Nuclear energy came into an environmentally unconscious world. When an
atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, the world was at war. Environmental con-
cerns, if there were any, lay buried and remote in people's minds.
1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946
Assumption of governmental responsibility for the control of nuclear
energy followed quickly on the heels of the war's end. President Truman called
for congressional action in 1945; the result is the Atomic Energy Act of 1946
(AEA 1946).1
AEA 1946 provides that:
subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common
defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy
shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public wel-
fare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in
private enterprise, and promoting world peace. 2
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1. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 585, Sec. 21, 60 Stat. 755 [hereinafter cited
as AEA 1946].
2. AEA 1946, Sec. l(a).
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The 1946 Act is a piece of cautious optimism. Though the law vested
government with a monopoly over nuclear materials, it laid the groundwork for
the expanded application of the peaceful atom. Rather than assign command of
nuclear energy development to military authorities, Congress chose the route of
civilian control. a
AEA 1946 created a Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy
(JCAE) and an independent executive branch agency, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC). Unique in several respects, the JCAE until recently possessed broad
legislative and oversight powers. But the Democratic caucus of the House of Re-
presentatives has voted to revoke the bill-writing power of the JCAE. Final action
is expected in the next session and the Senate is likely to do the same with respect
to itself. The outcome of this upheaval may include stricter congressional over-
sight of the nuclear industry. However, the JCAE's supervisory mandate under
AEA 1946 will probably remain unchanged. 4
During the Committee's early years, Congress and the American people
relied solely on the JCAE to satisfactorily control AEC activities.5 The Com-
mittee has come under increasing fire with the development in recent years of the
environmental movement. U.S. Senator Clinton P. Anderson, a committee mem-
ber, summarized the outlook of critics: the JCAE is considered "rather as a board
of guarantors, saying to the Congress and the American people that all is well,
even if many transactions are behind closed doors. " 6
The AEC was created to implement research and development, support
the exchange of scientific and technical information, and control production,
ownership and use of fissionable material. Its powers included the authority to
grant licenses and to make regulations in order to fulfill the stated purposes of
the law. 7
2. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
As potential commercial applications of nuclear energy evolved, pressure
grew to relax legal restraints, especially the government monopoly over owner-
ship of nuclear materials. Because foreign governments now also possessed "the
secret," the military rationale for government restrictions became ineffective.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA 1954),8 as amended, constitutes
government's response. AEA 1954 restructured the AEC, granted limited private
ownership of certain nuclear material, expanded the scope of licensing activities,
and gave the Commission rule-making powers. 9
Three types of nuclear materials are distinguished with reference to three
3. The Vandenburg amendment to the AEA 1946 did establish a Military Liaison Committee
to "advise and consult with" the AEC "on all atomic energy matters which the Committees [sic] deems to
relate to military applications." Id. Sec. 2(a) 4(c). Scientists were reluctant to leave atomic energy in mili-
tary hands. Hearings on S. Re& 179 Before the Special Committee on Atomic Energy, Part 1, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 103 (1945) (testimony of Dr. Harold Urey).
4. AEA 1946, Sec. 15 (b).
5. H. Green and A. Rosenthal, Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers 6 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Green and Rosenthal].
6. Green and Rosenthal, supra note 5, at 29-30.
7. AEA 1946, Secs. 7 (a), 12 (a).
8. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Sec. 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 et. seq. (1971) [hereinafter
cited as AEA 1954].
9. AEA 1954, Secs. 41 (a), 101-10, 161-69, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2061 (a), 2131-40, 2201-10
(1973).
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generalized stages of the fission fuel cycle. Source material, basically uranium
ore, 10 is mined and produced into special nuclear material." The latter is any
material "capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy."' 12 The
wastes left from the use of special nuclear material constitute byproduct mate-
rial. 13
Despite complaints from industrialists, Congress, in the 1954 act, vested
exclusive title to special nuclear material in the United States. The AEC was de-
signated licensing agent for the use of such materials.' 4 A 1964 amendment,
however, extended the right of ownership to private parties. 1s
With certain limited exceptions, the 1954 act also placed sole ownership
of facilities for the production of special nuclear material in governmental hands.
Yet the AEA of 1954 did contemplate the prospect of ownership of production
facilities by licensees -of the Commission.16 Private ownership of licensed pro-
duction facilities "is currently a rapidly growing industrial interest." 17 It is also
the focal point of recent environmental concerns. This is understandable not
only due to the real potential harm of developing technologies, as will be dis-
cussed below, but also because of the severely limited production experience of
private industry. The AEC endorsed, as early as 1964, a policy to transfer radio-
isotope production and distribution activities to private industry "as rapidly as
possible consistent with the national interest." 18 Yet today private industry
has still made no significant inroads into the production market. 19
Two types of licensees are envisaged by the 1954 AEA: section 10320
(commercial) and section 10421 (medical therapy and research and develop-
ment). Most controversy with respect to environmental problems has focused on
commercial licensees under section 103, especially the operators of reactors for
the commercial generation of electricity. 22
Reactors are of several types but they all work in a similar fashion. Heat,
the product of nuclear fission, is "released to a turbine generator where the heat
energy contained in the steam is converted to electricity." 23 Reactor types differ
10. AEA 1954, Sec. 11 (z), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014 (z) (1973). See Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, 10 C.F.R. Sec. 40.4 (h) (1976).
11. AEA 1954, See. 11 (aa), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014 (aa) (1973). See 10 C.F.R. See. 40.4 (i)
(1976).
12. AEA 1946 contains the initial formulation of this concept. AEA 1946, Sec. 5 (a).
13. AEA 1954, Sec. 11 (e), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014 (e) (1973). See 10 C.F.R. Sec. 30.4 (1976).
14. AEA 1954, Sec. 41 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2061 (a) (1973).
15. Act of August 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489 Sec. 1 et seq., 78 Stat. 602 (amending 42
U.S.C. Secs. 2011-13, 2072-73, 2075-78, 2133-34, 2153, 2201, 2221, 2233-34 (1965)).
16. AEA 1954, Sec. 41 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2061 (a) (1973).
17. 30 Fed. Reg. 3247 (1965).
18. 30 Fed. Reg. 3247 (1965).
19. Division of Biomedical and Environmental Research, ERDA, 11 Balanced Program Plan--
Fission 8 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Balanced Program Plan].
20. AEA 1954, Sec. 103, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2133 (1973).
21. AEA 1954, Sec. 104, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2134 (1973).
22. See, Denver Sun, Oct. 24, 1976, at 3, col. 1, and Stevens Point (Wis.) Daily Journal, Nov.
23, 1974, at 3, col. 1. The first of these articles relates the claims made by nine former Nuclear Regulatory
Commission staff members charging the agency with refusing to act upon safety questions which they raised.
Denver Sun, supra. The second article relates a debate between former AEC Chairman Dixie Lee Ray and
Dr. Paul Ehrlich of Stanford University. For a fairly even-handed treatment, see Skeptic, August, 1976.
23. "The reactor consists of an active core in which the fission reaction is sustained and in
which most of tIe energy is released as heat. The core contains the fissile fuel material, the moderator which
slows down the neutrons released by fission ... and the coolant which removes the heat produced during
fission." Nuclear Fuels Policy Working Group, The Atlantic Council, Nuclear Fuels Policy 17 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Fuels Policy ].
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principally with respect to their moderators 2 4 coolants, 25 and fuels.26 A light-
water reactor (LWR-either boiling or pressurized) utilizes ordinary ("light")
water as both coolant and moderator. Enriched uranium is used as fuel. The boil-
ing water reactor (BWR) allows the coolant to boil, thereby freeing it for direct
use within the turbines. In the pressurized water reactor (PWR), on the other
hand, the steam used to turn the generators is isolated from the coolant. "7
Light water reactors comprise most of the current nuclear energy work
force. Of the other types, the most significant in terms of the likelihood of its
future use is the liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). The LMFBR contains
no moderator, uses molten sodium as a coolant, and requires a mixed (uranium
and plutonium) oxide fuel (MOX) for efficient operation.2 As will be seen, all
of these reactors present real environmental risks.
Under AEA 1954, licensing of section 103 licensees is a two-step process.
First, a construction permit must be granted. Following the completion of con-
struction, the applicant must petition for an operating license. No license may be
granted which would be "inimical to the common defense and security or the
health and safety of the public." Though subsequent developments have some-
what altered the licensing procedure, the basic two-step process persists. 9
In addition, the 1954 act gives the AEC express rule-making authority
in order to establish
minimum criteria for the issuance of specific or general licenses for the
distribution of special nuclear material depending upon the degree of
importance to the common defense and security or to the health and
safety of the public. 30
AEC rule-making procedures start with a petition for rule-making. A docket
number is assigned and notice of filing is published in the Federal Register. If
24. Fuels Policy, supra note 23.
25. Fuels Policy, supra note 23.
26. Fuels Policy, supra note 23.
27. Fuels Policy, supra note 23.
28. Fuels Policy, supra note 23, at 20-21.
29. "Before the AEC issues either a construction permit or an operating license, it must re-
solve four principal issues regarding a proposed nuclear plant. These are: health and safety, environmental
protection, safeguards, and antitrust. The protection of public health and safety is foremost among these
issues. Under the AEC's NEPA [National Environmental Policy.ActJ procedures, comprehensive evaluations
and assessments are made of the full range of environmental effects-both radiological and non-radiological-
of each proposed nuclear plant, which are used to arrive at a balancing of benefits against environmental
costs in the public interest" U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, The Nuclear Industry--1973 (Wash. 1174-73),
reprinted in Hearings on Developments in the Energy Industry in General and the Nuclear Power Industry in
Particular Pursuant to Section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, Before the Joint Com.
mittee on Atomic Energy, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 271 (1974).
As will be seen below, these agency proceedings do not always live up to the standards formulated
in the preceding excerpt
Also it should be noted that a fair amount of construction is allowed prior to granting a construc-
tion permit and that there is a movement afoot within the successor to the AEC, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, to amalgamate the two steps into a single accelerated process. This will be accomplished through
advance site selection, thereby eliminating siting controversies likely to otherwise arise and standardization
of facility designs.
Environmentalists claim that the "pre-construction" construction constitutes a significant invest-
ment of time and money, thereby making industrialists resistant to abandoning a site if it should later be
found unsafe. Also, the environmental groups charge that one cannot simply plug in a pre-selected site with
a standard design and necessarily come up with a safe plant As they see it, the sum is greater than its parts.
See, for example, Hearings on Proposed Budget of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Fiscal Year 1977
Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, 26-27, 39-40 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Proposed Budget I.
30. AEA 1954, Sec. 53 (b), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2073 (b) (1973).
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the Commission considers it advisable, a hearing on the petition is scheduled.
Interested parties are given an opportunity to comment. An adopted regulation or
rule is then published in the Federal Register. 31
3. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974
The separation of commercial from medical and research licensees in sec-
tions 103 and 104, respectively, represents an early realization of distinctive
problems. It soon became apparent, however, that the section 103 licensing process
was itself caught up in a conflict between interests favoring strict regulation and
governmental personnel pushing for faster development of nuclear technology. In
answer to criticism, the AEC, in 1961, attempted to separate its promotional and
regulatory functions.32 The Division of Reactor Licensing was created as an in-
dependent branch of the Commission. Initial licensing activities were assigned to
it. 33
But this internal realignment did not stop criticism. Consequently, in
1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act. 4 The AEC was in effect
abolished and replaced by two separate organizations: the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA) 35 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC). 36
Though ERDA incorporates a portion of the non-regulatory functions
traditionally held by the AEC, its legislative mandate reaches beyond nuclear
energy. In conjunction with a series of subsequent statutes, the Reorganization
Act places upon ERDA responsibility for the promotion of other energy tech-
nologies.
The NRC inherited "all the licensing and related regulatory functions of
the Atomic Energy Commission."138 Indeed, the structure of the NRC is strik-
ingly similar to the organizational breakdown of the old AEC. In place of the
Division of Reactor Licensing, there is now an Office. of Nuclear Reactor Regu-
lation.39 An Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards has replaced the
old Division of Compliance. 4" Confirmatory research, previously conducted by
the Division of Reactor Safety Research, was not transferred to ERDA and is now
carried out by the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research.41 In addition, the
1974 Act rejuvenates, without altering, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
31. Administrative actions are to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. AEA 1954,
Sec. 181, 42 U.S.C. See. 2231 (1973). Such actions are of two kinds. Either they are adjudicatory proceed-
ings such as license decision-making or they are generic rule-making. Whether the AEC, and now the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, uses one or the other is a matter left for the Commission to decide. Morningside
Renewal Council, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 482 F. 2d 234 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 951 (1973).
32. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Sec. 1 et seq., 5 U.S.C. 5313-16, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 5801,
5811-20, 5841-49, 5871-79, 5891 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as ERA 19741.
33. Schraff, The Atomic Energy Commission (1971).
34. ERA 1974, Sec. 1 et seq., 5 U.S.C. 5316-16, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 5801, 5811-20, 5841-49,
5871-79, 5891 (Supp. 1976).
35. ERA 1974, Sec. 101, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5811 (Supp. 1976).
36. ERA 1974, Sec. 201, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5841 (Supp. 1976).
37. ERA 1974, Sec. 103,42 U.S.C. Sec. 5813 (Supp. 1976).
38. ERA 1974, Sec. 201 (f), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5841 (f) (Supp. 1976).
39. ERA 1974, Sec. 203 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5843 (a) (Supp. 1976).
40. ERA 1974, Sec. 204 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5844 (a) (Supp. 1976).
41. ERA 1974, Sec. 205 (a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5845 (a) (Supp. 1976).
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Panel (ASLBP),4 2 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Panel (ASLAP), 4 3
and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). "
Partly due to these structural similarities as well as for other reasons,
critics maintain that the NRC is no improvement over its predecessor. The most
glaring structural defect is that the old Division of Reactor Licensing, since 1961,
stood apart from the AEC as a quasi-independent licensing authority, while the
Reorganization Act integrated the Division's replacement into the new parent
body.4" Whatever the real degree of the Division's former independence, there
now was none. Partly as a consequence; the NRC instituted its own internal
reforms in 1975. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations was reorganized,
"establishing a [quasi-independent] division responsible for operating reactor
safety. "46 Just how successful this internal devolution will prove remains to
be seen.
The AEA 1946 and 1954 expressed concern for public welfare and human
safety. 47  But the Energy Reorganization Act is the first piece of nuclear legisla-
tion to state a congressional intent "to advance the goals of restoring, protecting,
and enhancing environmental quality."'48 The NRC and ERDA are directed to
give equal priority to "preservation of material resources [and] reduction of pol-
lutants" 49 as they allow for economic-related factors.
Implementation of such a policy has been antedated and reinforced by
the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 50 the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 5 l and other environmental legis-
lation and orders.
LETHAL PROBLEMS
Before addressing legal remedies for the environmental hazards created by
nuclear energy, it would be appropriate to review the nature of these hazards.
A current ERDA publication 52 considers the major environmental issues
engendered by the use of LWRs and LMFBRs in terms of a nine step fuel cycle:
42. Under AEA 1954, the AEC was authorized "to establish one or more atomic safety and
licensing boards . . . to conduct such hearings as the Commission may direct and make such intermediate
or final decisions as the Commission may authorize with respect to the granting, suspending, revoking or
amending of any license or authorization .. " AEA 1954, Sec. 191, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2241 (1973). Trans-
lated into practice the ASLBP and ASLAP review the sufficiency of the record and the adequacy of the
health and safety analysis prepared by the Commission staff to support necessary findings. See Union of Con-
cerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Commission, 499 F. 2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The functions of the
ASLBP and ASLAP were transferred to the NRC under the Reorganization Act. ERA 1974, Sec. 201 (g),
42 U.S.C. Sec. 5841 (g) (Supp. 1976).
43. ERA 1974, Sec. 203, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5843 (Supp. 1976).
44. AEA 1954 established the ACRS with a directive to "review safety studies and facility
license applications [and to] advise the Commission with regard to the hazards of proposed or existing
reactor facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards." AEA 1954, Sec. 29, 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2039 (1973). See also AEA 1954, Sec. 182 (b), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2232 (b) (1973). The Reorganization
Act makes no mention of the ACRS and thereby leaves it functioning without alteration.
45. ERA 1974, Sec. 205, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5845 (Supp. 1976).
46. Proposed Budget, supra note 29, at 61.
47. AEA 1946, Sec. 1 (a); AEA 1954, Sec. 1, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 (1973).
48. ERA 1974, Sec. 2, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5801 (Supp. 1976).
49. ERA 1974, Sec. 2, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5801 (Supp. 1976).
50. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Sec. 1 et seq., 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4321 et seq.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as NEPA].
51. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Sec. 1 et seq., 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251 et seq. (Supp.
1976).
52. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19.
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1) mining of uranium ore;
2) milling of the ore to produce purified uranium oxide (U30 8);
3) conversion of U3 08 to uranium hexafloride (UF 6 );
4) isotopic enrichment of U2 3 5 ;
5) conversion of the isotopically enriched UF 6 to U0 2 , recycling of
plutonium, and fabrication of fuel elements;
6) power production;
7) spent fuel reprocessing;
8) waste management;
9) fuel and waste transportion. 5 3
1. Mining of Uranium Ore.
There is little question that -the mining of uranium ore constitutes an
occupational threat to the mine-workers. Actually, the uranium itself is found
in such low concentrations - about 4 pounds of U 3 08 per ton - that the health
hazard really lies elsewhere. Uranium becomes radium as it decays "which in
turn slowly changes into a radioactive gas called radon which slowly seeps out
of the rocks and into the mine atmosphere." 4 Finally, the "gas changes into a
series of highly radioactive solid particles called 'radon daughters.' 1155 Radon
daughters, when inhaled, are liable to collect on the lung tissue and may pro-
duce cancer. No one precisely knows their long-term carcinogenic effects.
ERDA found that dusts containing uranium and radon gas and the daugh-
ters are all released to the atmosphere during mining operations. These materials
are also found "dissolved and suspended . . . in mine drainage water. ' '5 6 The
study concluded, however, that such releases do "not cause measureable increases
in environmental radioactivity outside the immediate vicinity of the mines."
5 7
2. Milling of the Ore
More serious environmental effects are thought to result from the milling
process. "[ U] ranium is crushed, ground, and then leached with either sulphuric
acid or sodium carbonate solution to extract the uranium values." 58 Further
processing draws out U 0 8in the form of "yellowcake." 5 9 The waste residue left
over, known as tailings, is dangerously radioactive. They are usually deposited
in man-made ponds. Most of the water evaporates, but some percolates into the
ground carrying radioactivity with it. Tailings have even been used in the foun-
dations of homes and schools. Others have been dumped into the Colorado River
and have entered its tributaries:
"The Federal Wat;r Pollution Control Agency quickly established that the
radioactivity downstream from the ... mill was almost five hundred times
normal levels. . . .this radioactivity was eight times more than the max-
imum amount permitted in drinking water....
53. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19.
54. H. Metzger, The Atomic Establishment 118 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Metzger].
55. Metzger, supra note 54.
56. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 6-7.
57. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 6-7.
58. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 7.
59. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 8.
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S.. [T] he worry here is that .. .man at the end of the food chain will
concentrate the radium into his bones.... 60
Despite all this, the ERDA study found that while "uranium milling
activities contribute to the content of radioactivity in the environment, it appears
from available measurements that population doses from this source cannot be
distinguished from background." 61
3. Conversion OfU 3 0 8 To UF 6 .
The potential for environmental damage from the process of converting
yellowcake into gaseous UF 6 is significant. There are two plants presently pro-
ducing UF 6 . One "uses a dry process of successive reduction, hydrofluorination
• . and fluorination of the uranium, followed by fractional distillation. The other
uses wet chemical solvent extraction followed by calcination to prepare a high-
purity uranium feed to the dry process steps. ' 62
These complicated techniques release various gases. "Of greatest con-
cern are the fluorides ... and their potential for accumulation in vegetation." 63
Also, uranium and soluble radionucleides, including radium, are released in water,
solid wastes, and sludge. The solid wastes and sludge are disposed of by burial;
the water evaporates. The report concludes that these occurrences Iare poten-
tial impacts that require attention" 64 without elaborating upon their nature.
4. Isotopic Enrichment Of U 23
The next step in the fuel cycle is uranium enrichment. Plans are now being
made to expand current uranium enrichment facilities in order to meet increased
demand. In April, 1976, ERDA issued a final environmental statement assessing
the relative costs and benefits of carrying through such a program.
Certain adverse environmental effects from the expansion are unavoidable,
according to the ERDA Final Environmental Statement. They include: a) "in-
creased water treatment costs and decreased. recreational and aesthetic values," 65
b) "[1] eachate from contaminated burial grounds [which] could adversely affect
groundwater quality," 6 6 c) "[a] ir quality... affected slightly due to gaseous and
particulate emission," 67 d) "[c] ooling tower operation . . . [that] may increase
local fog frequency and noise levels,"168 e) terrestrial effects entailing the pos-
sible destruction of "biota on [surrounding] plant acreages," 69 f) "minor local
effects [within about 350 feet] on terrestial flora and fauna ... due to salt and
chromate deposition.' "0 and g) "the principal adverse effect on acquatic biota: ...
an unknown degree of nutrient-induced eutrophication of local surface water." 71
60. Metzger, supra note 54, at 162-63.
61. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 8-9.
62. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 9.
63. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 9.
64. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 10.
65. ERDA, Final Environmental Statement--Expansion of U.S. Uranium Enrichment Capacity
4-2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Enrichment Capacity].
66. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65.
67. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65.
68. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65, at 4-3.
69. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65, at 4-3.
70. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65, at 4-3.
71. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65, at 4-3.
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By the year 2000, with 11 operating [enrichment] plants and 103 years
of plant operation, the total body population dose [of) . ... radiation ex-
posure [would represent] .. .an increase of 0.05% to that received from
natural background sources. 72
Though this change seems negligible, no one can predict with certainty the
long term effect of slight but sustained increases of radioactivity.
5. Conversion of UF6 To U0 2 , Recycling of Plutonium, and Fabrication of
Fuel Elements
Facilities for the conversion of uranium hexafluoride into mixed oxide
fuel are now being planned. This technological development depends upon first
recovering plutoniuin isotopes by reprocessing the spent fuel. Such adaptations
must be made if the light water reactor is to become an efficient means of gener-
ating power.
The recovery process leaves behind other solid plutonium wastes. Various
proposals have been made for the safe storage of these materials. Their radioac-
tivity will remain at highly dangerous levels for thousands of years. 74 Safeguards
against theft must also be taken because nuclear weapons utilize plutonium. A
great deal of expertise is apparently not requisite to construct such weapons.
One must only secure the requisite raw materials. 75
In addition, production of MOX "releases plutonium, americium, and
curium to the biosphere."176 The ERDA report states that "the radiation doses
that may result will be only a small fraction of natural background. Never-
theless, plutonium is very toxic if deposited in the body. .
6. Power Production
Environmental effects of the operation of nuclear reactors are the focal
point of major controversy. Extensive studies have been conducted to measure
the probability of accidental occurrences and their likely effects. In addition,
records are maintained of unanticipated events, and these are regularly reported
to Congress. 78
It is worthwhile briefly to examine the environmental implications of
normal reactor operations and postulated accidental possibilities.
A 1974 AEC report identifies nine possibly serious environmental prob-
lems arising from the normal operation of light water reactors: radiation expo-
sure from effluents; radioactive wastes indirectly released to the environment;
non-radioactive air pollutants; possible weather modifications resulting from
water vapor and waste heat; depletion of water resources; non-radioactive water
72. Enrichment Capacity, supra note 65, at 4-4. It should be noted that these effects axe only
some of-those considered unavoidable. There are many other avoidable effects which can be expected to neg-
atively affect environmental quality. Enrichment Capacity, supra -note 65, at 3.12.
73. The NRC, in 1975, deferred its decision whether to permit the plutonium recycle "until
alternative safeguards systems studies were complete and a safeguards program designed and subjected to
public review." Council of Environmental Quality, The Sixth Annual Report of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality 129 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
74. Skeptic, August, 1976, at 6. Annual Report, supra, note 73, at 130.
75. Newsweek, March 10, 1975, at 40.
76. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 12.
77. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 12.
78. See Skeptic, supra note 74, at 51. See also Hearings on the Status of Nuclear Reactor Safety
Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Part I, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 128-37 (statement of Dr. N.
Rasmnussen) (1973) (hereinafter cited as Reactor Safety].
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contaminants; internal facility operations liable to harm acquatic species; the
withdrawal of the construction site from alternative land uses, and deleterious
effects on the overall quality of life.7 9
The worst possible accident envisioned with respect to the light water
reactor is a loss of coolant accident followed by a melt-down of the reactor core.
Ultimately, if there were no injection of new coolant, the entire reactor core
would melt through the floor of the chamber. The consequent escape of radio-
activity would produce untold damage and destruction to man and the environ-
ment. Present safety measures to prevent such an accident, and remedy one that
has begun, are the subject of dispute.8
There is growing support among industrialists for the development of the
liquid metal fast breeder reactor (LMFBR). Its main attraction, in light of the
shortage of available uranium, is that it produces more fuel than it consumes.8 1
Predictions indicate that during normal operations, the LMFBR will be
environmentally as clean or cleaner than the present generation of light water
reactors. 82 The risk of accident, however, is nonetheless substantial.
Sodium, the coolant required by the LMFBR, rapidly oxidizes when ex-
posed to air. When exposed to liquid, however, sodium "burns spontaneously. " 83
As a result of the presence of steam generators, and the fact that generator leaks
are common, there is a high likelihood of fire. 84
Further, sodium exposed to liquid not only causes fire, but also releases
hydrogen, thereby increasing the reaction energy. 8" Since the LMFBR contains
several critical masses, 86 a sudden increase of reaction energy, combined with a
fire and a loss of coolant, could set off a chain reaction. In the event of a core
melt-down such a chain reaction is assured. 87
7. Spent Fuel Reprocessing
The reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel "releases virtually all of the noble
gasses . . . and tritium, and also small amounts of iodine to the environment....
Because of the large inventories of radioactive contaminants ... the possibility
of substantial environmental contamination from reprocessing plants is greater
than from power reactors." 88
79. Directorate of Regulatory Standards, U.S.A.E.C., Nuclear Power Facility Performance
Characteristics for Making Environmental Impact Statements 3-7, 3-16, 3-31 (1974).
80. Reactor Safety, supra note 78. See also Joint Hearing on Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Action Requiring Safety Inspections Which Resulted in Shutdown of Certain Nuclear Powerplants Before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Committee on Government Operations (1975).
81. Annual Report, supra note 73, at 130.
82. T. Cochran, The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor 152 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Coch-
ran].
83. Cochran, supra note 85, at 171.
84. Cochran, supra note 85, at 172. The risk of a LOCA is also greater in the LMFBR; because
sodium "becomes intensely radioactive when exposed to neutrons ... provisions must be made for refueling
the reactor without the benefit of visual observation, thereby increasing the possibility of refueling acci-
dents." Cochran, supra note 85, at 172.
85. Cochran, supra note 85, at 172.
86. A critical mass is sufficient nuclear material in great enough concentrations to produce
an atomic explosion.
87. Cochran, supra note 85, at 172. "It takes only a slight compaction (about 2 per cent
volume reduction of a core) to trigger an explosive nuclear runaway." Cochran, supra note 85, at 173.
88. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 17.
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8. Waste Management
Future reprocessing plants will reduce the release of radioactively high-
level liquid and solid wastes. By converting the liquid wastes to solid form, then
storing the wastes on-site for five to 10 years and, finally, shipping them for
permanent storage at a federal repository, it is believed that environmental re-
leases can be substantially eliminated. 89 There is a great deal of dispute, however,
as to the likelihood of leakage and the availability of alternatives; the long-term
outcome is uncertain.
9. Fuel and Waste Transportation
Fuel and waste transportation occurs at several steps along the fuel cycle.
Shipments are made by both rail and truck, 90 and the reliability of air shipments
is currently under study.91 Two other areas of concern are accidental radiation
exposure and, with the increased use of plutonium in LMFBRs, theft. Under
normal conditions, however, there is no significant environmental danger from
fuel and waste transportation. 92
LEGAL SOLUTIONS
Governmental responsibility for environmental protection usually takes
shape in three types of regulations or laws. The law establishes: (1) a methodol-
ogy of environmental protection, (2) limitations on the use or emission of speci-
fied substances, or (3) means to preserve a single natural resource. A fourth
method receiving increased attention is the implementation of financial incentives.
1. Methodological Protection: The NRC and NEPA
NRC actions encompass both the methodological and the specified
substances approaches. Methological tools include general design criteria, site
criteria, regulatory guides, letters of the ACRS, and decisions by ASLBP, ASLAP,
and the Commission itself. In addition, the NRC relies on industry codes and
standards whenever feasible.93
These methological considerations cannot fully be understood without
reference to other influential legislation. The National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) 94 has had a great impact on the procedures used in the licensing
of commercial nuclear reactors. Section 102(2)(c) of this act calls upon all fed-
eral government agencies to include a detailed environmental impact statement
89. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 18.
90. Annual Report, supra note 73, at 129-30.
91. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19. at 21.
92. The NRC began a rule-making proceeding and undertook to prepare an environmental
impact statement regarding the air transportation of radioactive materials in June, 1975. However, Congress
responded in August, 1975, with an act to prohibit licensed air transportation of plutonium except for plu-
tonium in a medical device until a safe container is developed. This container must be able to sustain a crash
and blast-testing equivalent to a crash and explosion of a high-flying aircraft. See 16 Nuclear Law Bulletin
24 (1974).
93. Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 21-22 "There is, however, a potential for trans-
portation accidents, followed by exposure of the public to radionucleides released to the environment"
Balanced Program Plan, supra note 19, at 21-22.
94. P. Morris, Nuclear Power Plant Safety, in Mechanical Failure: Definition of the Problem
143, 147-48 (National Bureau of Standards ed. 1976).
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"in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 95
NEPA establishes a Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), designed
initially to act as an advisory body. 96 But the President, in 1970, ordered the
CEQ to establish guidelines for agency preparation of section 102 statements.97
These guidelines call for draft statements "prepared and circulated to the
Council early enough in the agency review process before an action is taken
in order to permit meaningful consideration of the environmental issues
involved." 98
Even though NEPA did not literally empower the Council to issue such
guidelines, the AEC was obliged to comply with CEQ directives. Certain other
effects of NEPA on AEC (and now NRC) practices have been settled only
after lengthy litigation.
Most cases dealing with NEPA, whether or not they concern nuclear
energy, can be read in terms of judicial activism vis-a-vis agency procedures
or findings of fact. In Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. U. S. Atomic
Energy Commission, 99 the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit concluded that "Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort of
careful and informed decision-making process and creates judicially enforceable
duties." '°°The AEC was ordered fully to comply throughout the agency review
process, something it had apparently been reluctant to do.1 1
Two years later, the same court used a "rule of reason" in holding
that NEPA required a detailed statement for the proposed LMFBR program.
102
Previously, statements were prepared only for individual actions and facilities.
The "rule of reason" which the court recommends consists of balancing
various competing interests'0 3 and, in effect, constitutes the economist's cost-
benefit analysis. Today, cost-benefit analysis is typically employed by the NRC.
It is also noteworthy that this decision takes the Circuit Court further than
Calvert Cliffs. Here the court does not merely enforce NEPA-mandated pro-
cedures. It demonstrates a willingness to prescribe substantive formulae which
are, in its own view, guides to statutory compliance.
In continuing this activist posture, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D. C. Circuit recently found that the NRC's rule-making proceedings on the
matter of radioactive waste storage failed to address major contentions that were
raised.' 0 4 The agency findings were considered the result of "capricious and
95. NEPA, Sec. 102 (2) (c), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332 (c) (i) (1973).
96. NEPA, Sec. 202, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4342 (1973).
97. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970). Though these guidelines are advisory
only (Hiram Clarke Civil Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F. 2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973)), they are given substantial weight
by the courts. See Carolina Action v. Simon, 389 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.N.C. 1975), affd on other grounds,
522 F. 2d 295 (4th Cir. 1975).
98. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1500 et seq. (Suon. 1976).
99. 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
100. 449 F. 2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
101. 449 F. 2d 1109, 1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
102. Scientist's Institute for Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC, 481 F. 2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
103. 481 F. 2d 1079, 1092 (1973).
104. NRDC v. NRC, 9 ERC 1149, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Aeschliman v. NRC, 9 ERC
1289 (D.C. Cir. 1976) in which the court ruled that an intervenor in an agency proceeding "must only
bring 'sufficient attention' to the issue to stimulate the Commission's consideration of it. Thereafter, it is
incumbent on the Commission to undertake its own preliminary investigation .... The rule of reason,
the court found, required nothing more of the intervenor. 9 ERC 1289, 1293-94.
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arbitrary" proceedings and were set aside.
The D. C. Circuit uses the "rule of reason" in reviewing the adequacy
of agency proceedings under NEPA. On the other hand, the "capricious and
arbitrary" standard is used to review final orders of the NRC under AEA 1954. 105
However, NEPA considerations may also be raised within the context of an
action regarding NRC final orders.
NEPA contains no jurisdictional provision. Actions brought under it
must endure the lengthy process of district court trials. On the other hand,
cases filed under AEA 1954 go directly before the circuit court "in which the
petitioner resides or has its principal office, or in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." 10 6 The activist role of the D. C.
Circuit explains why so many cases are brought before it.
Certain tactical considerations are thus involved in deciding whether to
bring suit under NEPA or whether to raise NEPA within the context of an AEA-
based action. Though the second route accelerates judicial review, it delays the
moment at which an action can be filed. At the same time, an AEA-based action
widens the opportunity for forum shopping, but may subject the petitioner to
a tougher standard of review than an action grounded in NEPA.
Despite the success of environmental groups in the D. C. Circuit, the United
States Supreme Court has been less willing to inject its judicial presence into
administrative deliberations. In Public Service Co. v. Porter County Chapter, 107
the Supreme Court ruled that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals "erred in
rejecting the Agency's interpretation of its own regulations." 10 8 As long as
the NRC "sensibly" applied its regulations, "the Court of Appeals was 'obligated
to regard as controlling (such) a reasonable, consistently applied administrative
interpretation.' "109
In Porter County, the Court found for the industrialists." But if the.
decision means that unreasonable and inconsistent interpretations are now to
be the standard of AEA judicial review, the holding actually liberalizes the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard currently used by the D. C. Circuit. Consequently,
Porter County is probably a pyrrhic victory for the pro-nuclear forces.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, "however, presents the environmental forces with
a real defeat. It strikes directly at the rule of reason and judicial activism of the
D. C. Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit stated in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton 112 that "the courts must reserve the right to.analyze federal actions to deter-
mine if, in fact, a comprehensive program, however labelled, is under way or pro-
posed."1113 If the analysis turns up such a program, the court's decision in Scien-
105. 9 ERC 1149. The capricious and arbitrary standard is contained within the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706 (2) (a) (1967) [hereinafter cited as APA]. A court must set aside agency
action which is "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
APA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2) (a) (1967). The NRC is subject to the APA. AEA 1954, Sec. 189 (b) 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2239 (b) (Supp. 1976).
106. Act of January 1, 1975, Sec. 3, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2341 (Supp. 1976), Act of September 6,
1966, sec. 4 (e), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2343 (Supp. 1976).
107. Nothern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Walton League, 423 U.S. 12 (1975).
108. 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975).
109. 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975).
110. 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975). See also Porter Cty. Chapter of Izaak Walton League v. AEC, 503 F.
2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1976).
111. 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976).
112. 514 F. 2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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tist's Institute for Pub. Info., Inc. v. AEC'1 4 mandates the preparation of a
section 102 statement. The method of analysis to be used is again the balancing
technique of the rule of reason.
In reversing Sierra Club v. Morton,115 the Supreme Court commented
that NEPA "clearly states when an impact statement is required, and mentions
nothing about a balancing of factors." 116 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., criticized
the lower court's decision:
A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a
balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the germina-
tion process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should
be prepared. Such an assertion of judicial authority would leave the agen-
cies uncertain as to their procedural duties under NEPA, would invite
judicial involvement in the day-to-day decisionmaking process of the
agencies, and would invite litigation. As the contemplation of a project
and the accompanying study thereof do not necessarily result in a proposal
for major federal action, it may be assumed that the balancing process
devised by the Court of Appeals also would result in the preparation of a
good many unnecessary impact statements. 117
2. Specified Substance Limitations and Natural Resource Preservation:
The NRC and the EPA
NRC regulations establish limitations on the use and emission of radio-
active materials." 8 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), under
authority granted by the President, also holds jurisdiction over certain uses of
radioactive materials. According to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, the EPA
was assigned the "functions of the Atomic Energy Commission . . . to the
extent that such functions . . . consist of establishing generally applicable en-
vironmental standards for the protection of the general environment from radio-
active material."' 9 EPA duties were limited to "the general environment out-
side the boundaries of locations under the control of persons possessing or
using radioactive material." 120
The Reorganization Plan also transferred other duties to the EPA in-
cluding enforcement functions under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA). 121 By the terms of this act, the EPA is to assure the preservation of
applicable water quality standards in the navigable waters of the United States. 122
Interagency conflict arose soon afterwards over the meaning of the
Reorganization Plan. The AEC claimed, for instance, that "generally applicable
environmental radiation standards" authorized the EPA to set "ambient or
exposure limits unrelated to class of activity."' 123 EPA officials argued that dif-
113, 514 F. 2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
114. See text corresponding to note, supra note 102.
115. 514 F. 2d 856, 874 (D.C. Cit. 1975).
116. 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2728 (1976).
117. 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2729 (1976).
118. 10 C.F.R. Sec. 20.1 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
119. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (Supp. 1970).
120. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (Supp. 1970).
121. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15, 623 (Supp. 1970).
122. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Sec. 1 et seq., 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251 etseq. (Supp. 1976).
123. See Office of General Counsel, EPA, A Collection of Legal Opinions 275 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Legal Opinions].
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ferent "generally applicable" standards could be fixed "for different classes of
activity." 124 Later, the AEC withdrew from its position. By the time of Calvert
Cliffs in 1971, the EPA asserted without challenge that "EPA water quality stan-
dards. . . establish a minimum below which AEC licensees cannot go.''125 Two
AEC-EPA joint memoranda in 1973 formalized the EPA position. 126 Thus, in
1975, the EPA proposed rules for environmental protection from radiation caused
by nuclear power operations. The interagency position was further clarified: the
EPA guides are minimums but primary responsibility for their implementation
is vested in the NRC. 127
Yet a 1976 Supreme Court decision, Train v. Colorado Pub. Int. Research
Group, 128 redefines the respective roles of the NRC and EPA. The Court, fefer-
ring to the legislative history of the FWPCA, held that the EPA has no authority
to regulate discharge into the nation's waterways of those nuclear materials
subject to regulation by the NRC. Sovrce, special nuclear, and byproduct ma-
terials are not 'pollutants' within the meaning of the FWPCA. All other radio-
active materials, e.g. radium and accelerator-produced isotopes, are covered by
the FWPCA. 29 It is too early to predict the effect of this decision. For the pres-
ent, however, the NRC continues to rely on the EPA in denying or granting ap-
proval of nuclear reactor construction permits and operating licenses.
3. Financial Incentives
An alternative method of environmental protection through law is the
creation of financial incentives not to pollute. A negative incentive such as the tax
on nuclear materials waste storage recently imposed by Kentucky has the effect
of discouraging industrial expansion into the reactor field.
130
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, 131on the other hand, develops positive
financial incentives at the federal level. Qualifying pollution control devices will
allow their purchaser an investment credit to the extent of 50% of the property's
cost, amortized over a five-year period. The asset must have a useful life of at
least five years and "must not lead to a significant increase (more than 5%)
in the capacity or useful life of the plant." Nor can the device "significantly
alter the production process or reduce operating cost." 132
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE
We have looked at different types of environmental protection laws,
distinguished on the basis of their functions and contents. Some require a meth-
odology of environmental protection; some aim to preserve specific natural
resources, and others attempt to place limits on the use or emission of speci-
124. Legal Opinions, supra note 122.
125. Legal Opinions, supra note 122, at 581.
126. 38 Fed. Reg. 24,936 (Supp. 1973). 38 Fed. Reg. 32,965 (Supp. 1973).
127. 40 Fed. Reg. 23, 420 (Supp. 1975).
128. 96 S. Ct. 1938 (1976).
129. 96 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (1976).
130. Audubon Magazine, November, 1976, at 131.
131. Pub. L. No. 94-455, Sec. 1 et seq., 90 Stat. 1520 [hereinafter cited as Tax Reform Act]
(amending I.R.C. Sec. 3 et seq.).
132. Tax Reform Act, Sec. 2122 (b) (amending I.R.C. Sec.' 169 (d)). See Arthur Anderson and
Co., Tax Reform Act of 1976--Summary of Changes and Impact on Selected Businesses 94 (1976).
1977]
Journal of Legislation
fied substances.
But if there is to be a fully developed understanding of environmental law,
these legal controls must also be delineated in terms of their purposes. Common
law .is traditionally punitive or remedial. Actions are punished, wrongful condi-
tions are alleviated, only after a judicial determination of the occurence of those
conditions. The common law insists on specificity and, chronologically, the pun-
ishment or remedy always follows and never precedes the wrong. Deterrence of
future wrong-doing is an incidental side-effect of punitive and remedial legal
norms. Perhaps setting an example will discourage others from the same sort
of behavior. Perhaps not.
Environmental laws, such as those discussed previously, are preventive
laws. Their sole purpose is the prevention of unlawful behavior before it occurs.
Philosophically, preventative norms are the outgrowth of utilitarianism and, more
recently, the sociological school of jurisprudence. Historically, preventive laws
are a contemporary phenomenon and a convincing argument can be made that
they are the product of runaway technological change, viz: the only way to
control technology is to slow it down; preventive laws silently express this un-
articulated need.
Whatever the persuasiveness of such an argument, the potential risks of
uncontrolled nuclear energy development are something not even the staunchest
pro-nuclear advocate is ready to live with. Preventative environmental measures
are a universally recognized need, but preventive law seriously challenges the
integrity of the present legal system. While the judicial process operates some-
what apart from the hustle of other societal spheres, the enforcement of pre-
ventive laws means the legal system cannot always wait for wrongdoers to come
to it.
Instead, the law must reach out and prevent wrongdoing. As shown above,
some courts are more willing to get involved than others. There is after all no
assurance in the minds of some judges that greater judicial involvement will do any
good. But there is good possibility that it will undermine judicial objectivity.
..... The challenge. to the legal structure, therefore, is, ironically, also one of
change. It is ironic because the courts are being asked to slow technological
change by themselves changing.
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